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Hosting the Small Island
Developing States: two scenarios
Milla Emilia Vaha
Faculty of Management, University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland
Abstract
Purpose – It has been estimated that some Small Island Developing States might have only decades
before their territories become uninhabitable. Future of these states poses timely questions to world
politics. The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the potential hosts and
endangered states at the time of relocation by looking at two relocation scenarios: Kiribati/New Zealand
and the Maldives/Sri Lanka.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses normative international political theory to explore
the nature of relocation. It critically examines the proposal for the free right to choose the new host state.
Guided by two examples, the paper proposes that we should not ignore the contingent reasoning when
evaluating these hypothetical scenarios.
Findings – The paper argues that the endangered state might have ethical grounds for its rights–
claims to continuous existence on a chosen territory. At the same time, both scenarios looked at here
also impose serious constraints. By illustrating these constraints, the paper aims at mapping some
central challenges that the continuity of endangered states creates to international state-system. The
paper argues that the complex relationships between the potential hosts and the relocating communities
should not be ignored.
Originality/value – This paper provides a contextual analysis of two hypothetical relocation scenarios. In
doing so, it relies on comparative research in two regions and offers a normative argument in relation to the
rights of both endangered and host populations.
Keywords Migration, Climate change, Relocation, International Relations, Small island states
Paper type Conceptual paper
1. Introduction
Sea-level rise affects Small Island Developing States. The International Panel on Climate
Change noted the special vulnerability of island nations as early as 2001 (Hey et al., 2001).
Low-lying atoll states such as the Marshall Islands and Kiribati in the South Paciﬁc Ocean
and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean are estimated to be at the greatest risk if sea-level rise
continues. While no one can predict with certainty what will happen to these states should
they be submerged beneath the ocean, relocation has been considered at least by the political
leaders of these states as an alternative, and sometimes even the only plausible, imaginary[1].
In addition to migration, other alternatives, such as “nation ex-situ” (Burkett, 2013) and
“continuous recognition” (Stoutenburg, 2015) have been explored in the legal literature as well.
In each case, if the relocation becomes timely, the question of course is where are these people
going to relocate? Some of the Small Island Developing States already have historical ties with
© Milla Emilia Vaha. Published by Emerald Publishing Limited. This article is published under the
Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and
create derivative works of this article (for both commercial & non-commercial purposes), subject to
full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at
http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode
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other states, such as the Marshall Islands to the USA or Niue and Tokelau to New Zealand[2].
Others, such as Tuvalu and Kiribati, have existing educational and labor schemes with their
larger Paciﬁc neighbors Australia and NewZealand.
Relocation is a complex political and legal matter. On the one hand, the rights of potential
climate migrants need to be solved, as the contemporary international legal framework
provides no protection for “climate refugees”. On the other hand, if these states are going to
continue their existence as states, the rights and obligations deriving from statehood on
foreign land need to be reconsidered. Relocation is not only a matter of migrating
individuals. It is provocatively also a matter of rights and responsibilities related to
continuous existence as a political community. Whereas the proposals to relocate a certain
amount of – or even all – citizens from the island communities to new host states seem
plausible enough (given that we are only talking about less than a few million people who
are at the highest risk), relocating political communities with continuing collective rights
seems to be a different proposal altogether. It is a proposal that raises several interesting
dilemmas from the perspective of international politics and law, both theoretically and in
terms of political practice. Some of these questions have been discussed lately,
predominantly by international lawyers (Gerrard and Wannier, 2013; McAdam, 2012a;
Stoutenburg, 2015; Yamamoto and Esteban, 2014). The ethical challenges related to these
potential relocation scenarios, however, have not yet been sufﬁciently explored.
To illustrate some of these ethical questions – and most importantly to contextualize
them – the paper at hand looks at two previously proposed relocation scenarios: the
Maldives relocation plan to Sri Lanka and Kiribati’s plan to relocate its population to New
Zealand. In both cases, the proposal has actually been made to relocate populations to new
territories in prospective host countries. In both cases, one might argue, the endangered
populations have strong ethical grounds for their rights–claims to continuous existence on a
chosen territory. Both Kiribati and the Maldives are low-lying atoll states and considered by
the United Nations as highly vulnerable. In both cases as well, the proposal is to relocate to a
signiﬁcantly larger neighboring country that has regional and cultural similarities with the
endangered home state. In addition, in both cases, there is already a substantial migrated
population from the island state in the suggested host country. The historical and communal
ties of migration are therefore already in place, arguably helping the integration process of
the greater population into their new homelands.
Yet, the existing arrangements allow only a certain, limited number of individuals to seek
residency in these countries. These arrangements, it might be argued, are not sufﬁcient
when the majority of the i-Kiribati and Maldivian community need to leave their homeland.
At the same time, both scenarios also impose other serious constraints. What is at stake here
is the particular suitability of potential host state to accommodate the newcomers. Politically
and culturally, there might be reasons such as economic capacity or domestic cohesion that
have to be taken into account when considering the suitability of hosting endangered
populations. Normatively, it also has to be considered if the proposed host country is the one
that has the speciﬁc responsibility to welcome the incomers in the ﬁrst place[3].
In my previous work on the right of Small Island Developing States to exist, I have
theoretically explored the idea of continuous statehood through the potentially conﬂictual
territorial rights–claims of Small Island Developing States and their new homelands in the
event that the endangered state relocates to a territory that belongs to another state (Vaha,
2015). I have argued that the Small Island Developing States might have the right to
continuous existence as states. If this is the case, there might also be a corresponding duty to
enable this continuous existence. In the framework of the international state system, this
responsibility falls to the states that are not at risk of state-extinction themselves. How do
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we determine which states have the responsibility to host the relocating island communities
is not, however, straightforward.
By offering a comparative snapshot of the rights of both relocating and host populations
in the two cases of Kiribati and the Maldives, this paper aims to map some central
challenges that relocating endangered island communities might create in the context of the
existing international system, a system that relies on the autonomy of sovereign states. As
JaneMcAdam has punctually noted in her work:
Whereas Paciﬁc islanders could once move freely to other islands in times of resource scarcity or
climate change, the legal (and sometimes physical) barriers to entry imposed by states today
considerably restrict the freedom of movement (McAdam, 2012b, p.109).
This study is not only of academic interest: if the estimations of sea-level-rise are accurate, the
question of relocation must be solved. In the world, in which the planet’s surface is already
divided into domestic territories by sovereign boundaries, the right to continuous existence of
the political community without its own territory is going to be a controversial one.
It has to be noted from the outset that the discussion that follows is so far hypothetical. As
pointed out above, no one knows with certainty what the future of Small Island Developing
States will look like. These relocation imaginaries are not shared by all, perhaps not even by
many in the endangered states[4]. The worst-case scenario has received some timely criticism
in academic literature as well, quite deservedly so. McAdam, for one, argues that both
academics and the island leaders have exploited “doomsday” vocabulary to portray an
“Atlantis-style” alternative in which no one has any certainty (McAdam, 2012a, p. 123). Jon
Barnett has noted that by portraying the situation of Small Island Developing States as solely
one of relocation, more hopeful positive imaginaries are lost and not actively pursued in
political practice (Barnett, 2017). The following paper agrees with both McAdam and Barnett
that there are both political and normative problems in portraying the futures of Small Island
Developing States as “doomsday” scenarios, with the most important challenge being that the
citizens and leaders themselves do not unanimously support to this scenario across the island
states. Interviews conducted with both the Maldivian and South Paciﬁc leaders have pointed in
this direction[5], as well as the previous research conducted on the local communities has done
(Kelman, 2015; Kohtari, 2014; McAdam, 2012a). However, to explore the normative elements of
potential relocation, which might or might not become a future reality for at least some part of
these populations, this paper accepts the “doomsday scenario” for the sake of argument.
2. Selecting the host state
The worst-case scenario for the Small Island Developing States is that their territories
become uninhabitable and the communities are forced to move. This paper explores this
scenario. One of the key concerns of islanders has been that when the time comes, they must
be able to “migrate with dignity[6]”. The idea of “migration with dignity” includes two
important components: the right to the continuous existence of endangered populations, and
the global community’s responsibility towards the Small Island Developing States. In the
words of the former president of Kiribati, Anote Tong:
I have, time and time again, expressed my deep disappointment at the apparent lack of care by
the many countries which can do the most to do something about this global scourge. I have even
questioned the eﬀectiveness of our international governance system in dealing with what is
unquestionably an issue of survival which can only be addressed at the international level. How can
we, in all conscience, and with all the science available to us, continue to regard this issue as a
matter of sovereign right? Until we as a global community can commit to addressing this greatest
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moral challenge, there can never be any credibility or sincerity in any of our other initiatives.
(Tong, 2015a, p. 24, [sic], emphasis added).
“The government of Kiribati,” Jane McAdam has written:
Is keen to secure international agreements in which other states recognize that climate change has
contributed to their predicament and acknowledge “relocation” as part of their obligations to
assist (McAdam, 2012a, p. 200).
The state ofﬁcials especially in the Paciﬁc region have indeed argued on several occasions
that the existential threat their countries now face is not only a matter of the right to exist
but also actually a human rights matter. In the Suva Declaration from September 2015, the
Paciﬁc leaders urged the Conference of Parties in Paris to ensure “that human rights to exist
as a people are protected (Paciﬁc Island Development Forum, 2015, emphasis added)”.
Distinguished international voices, the United Nations Special Envoy on Climate Change
Mary Robinson as an example, have repeatedly stressed that climate change deﬁnitely has a
human rights dimension (Robinson, 2010). While one has to be cautious of interpreting the
ethos of political leaders – who of course have their own political agendas, – the position
taken by the islanders is indeed an interesting one. What they are fundamentally proposing
is not only that climate change threatens their very existence as sovereign states but also
that they have the human right to continue to exist as such corporeal bodies. The question
then is how the global community can address this “greatest moral challenge of our time”.
There has been an increasing interest in climate justice literature regarding
responsibilities towards climate refugees, as well as on legal matters in the study of
international law, especially related to the inundation of land. Many of these debates aim to
offer some sort of compensation to endangered populations (Ödalen, 2014; Risse, 2009). In
their recent chapter, Clare Heyward and Jörgen Ödalen make an interesting proposal
according to which the citizens of Small Island Developing States should be offered a
“passport for territorially dispossessed” that would give them the right to choose any
particular country as their new homeland (Heyward and Ödalen, 2016, p. 209). According to
Heyward and Ödalen, only through the freedom to choose to relocate wherever, could the
islanders be offered a true compensation for their dilemma in which, by its nature, can never
be properly compensated (as no one can offer the Small Island Developing States their
islands back if they submerge underwater). “A full free choice,” they argue, “is the “next best
thing” (ibid, p. 213)”.
According to the rationale of Hayward and Ödalen, being forced to migrate is obviously
something one has the right to receive compensation for. Additionally, climate change that
has fundamentally caused the forced relocation of Small Island Developing States is the
responsibility of all states, and particularly of developed states. While different states have
contributed differently to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, no state has a clean history
with regard to pollution (Heyward and Ödalen, 2016, p. 218). Therefore, Hayward and
Ödalen argue:
All states have international obligations towards stateless persons, regardless of the cause of
statelessness, so a low-emitting state might have an obligation to accept those who are
territorially dispossessed by climate change-induced sea-level-rise, regardless of their lack of
historical responsibility (ibid, p. 219).
The last part of the sentence is central here, as it is often called for in climate justice
literature that the greatest polluters should also bear the heaviest burdens concerning
climate change adaptation and mitigation. This responsibility is commonly expressed
by the “polluter pays principle”. According to the principle, actors that contribute most
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to greenhouse gas emissions through extensive use of fossil fuels should also bear the
greatest responsibility for the negative effects of climate change (Caney, 2009; Shue,
2014, pp. 180-194; Singer, 2002). Here, responsibility corresponds to the causal harm
inﬂicted by the polluters. Causal responsibility as an idea is a rather simple one.
According to casual responsibility, the duty-bearer has responsibility toward the
rights-holder if (and only if) it has causally attributed to the harm of which the rights-
holder is suffering. This form of responsibility corresponds quite neatly to our legal
understanding of responsibility as a “contributory fault”. As deﬁned by Joel Feinberg,
responsibility exists if, and only if, the responsible agent created/caused the harm in
question (or at least their action substantially contributed to the harm, i.e. the harm
occurred for the action of agent); the contributory conduct was in some way faulty (i.e.
considered as blameworthy); and if the harmful action was truly the fault of the duty-
bearer (i.e. there is a link between the faulty action and the harm) (Feinberg, 1968,
p. 674). Whereas causal responsibility as a principle is straightforward, its allocation in
actual political practice is less so; what causal harms are we looking at that would
trigger the application in which a polluter pays? What kind of action should be
identiﬁed as a contributory fault, directly harming the Small Island Developing States
and causing their actual relocation? When is the speciﬁc duty-bearer genuinely faulty
for the harm[7]?
In an important legal decision from 2013, the New Zealand High Court declared that there
are no grounds to seek refugee status in New Zealand based on climate change threats. Ioane
TEITIOTA, a Kiribati citizen, had applied for refugee status for himself and his family
(including three children who were born in New Zealand), on the grounds that his home
country of Kiribati was no longer inhabitable in the longer term. However, the deciding
judge found this reasoning unconvincing. First, many parts of Kiribati still are inhabitable;
and second, there were no foundations for the claim that the high emitters, New Zealand
included, would have had the intention to harm Kiribati (New Zealand High Court, 2013,
p. 10). Thus, persecution by active human agency that it is required by the international
refugee legislation for refugee status did not occur. To be blameworthy for harm, it can be
argued, there needs to be the intention to harm. Obviously, such intention is hard if not
impossible to conﬁrm in international political practice, especially if we look at the processes
of historical wrongdoing that have proceeded for the long term, such as is the case with
climate change. Interestingly, the Small Island Developing States do not even necessarily
base their argument for the right to relocation solely on the climate change threats. Kiribati,
for instance, has made it clear that it would be “lobbying neighboring states like Australia
and New Zealand for migration opportunities even if the climate change threat did not exist
(former president Anote Tong in McAdam, 2012a, p. 203, emphasis in original)”. In these
circumstances, it is important to think thoroughly the nature of responsibilities the other
states have toward the Small Island Developing States, as well as the rights the endangered
populations have to relocate.
Here, the need for a different kind of reasoning on climate responsibilities comes in. The
proposal put forward by Heyward and Ödalen relies on universal responsibility: every state
has the duty to accept the territorially dispossessed, even if some modiﬁcations could be
made if the signiﬁcant number of islanders had chosen a particular country as their new
homeland (Heyward and Ödalen, 2016, pp. 220-222). While some (if not most) global climate
responsibilities are universal – and are even identiﬁed as such by the UNFCCC through the
concept of “common but differentiated responsibilities[8]” – this paper suggests that the
right to choose a new homeland should also be evaluated in more particularistic terms,
paying attention to the speciﬁc relationship that the potential host and endangered states
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have. While this form of reasoning relies more on contingent, rather than on moral,
reasoning, these reasons are nonetheless crucially important in thinking about the peaceful
future of both the endangered and the host state.
Following Heyward and Ödalen, there is a universal moral duty to relocate territorially
dispossessed people. Because it is amoral duty, the objections of hosting cannot be based on
economic and cultural constrains that could cause unfair burdens on hosting states. These
reasons, they argue, are contingent, not moral. Heyward and Ödalen admit that there can be
reasons for arguing that the right to choose a new home country unfairly distributes heavier
burdens on some states than on others. However, at the same time, they also argue that these
reasons have no real-life relevance, given the limited scale of the phenomenon and the means
of (still non-existent) international compensation that the new host state could demand for
its efforts to relocate islanders.
This work agrees with Heyward and Ödalen that the identiﬁcation of the speciﬁc harm-
relationship in historical terms might not be the most fruitful way of approaching the
question of relocation. Historical and causal harms that have created the situation in which
the Small Island Developing States ﬁnd themselves cannot be easily identiﬁed, nor can we
necessarily appoint blameworthiness of any kind. In fact, many of the affected societies do
not even want to engage with futile “blame game” (McAdam, 2012a, p. 201). Thus, instead of
appointing responsibilities and duties to host, it might be more fruitful to examine the
suitability to host in further detail. Whereas in the case of New Zealand, to use our exemplary
case, one could claim that the special responsibility of New Zealand to serve as the host
country can be justiﬁed by its more developed status and its role in regional leadership,
together with Australia (even without the intention to pollute and harm its island neighbors
in particular), the same cannot be necessarily as easily said about Sri Lanka. The contingent
objections should not be downplayed and the discussion below aims to illustrate why this is
the case.
3. Two relocation scenarios
“Adaptation for Kiribati is beyond our borders. Relocation is by far the only adaptation
option, this is where migration with dignity comes in (Tong, 2015b)”, Tong stated during his
plenary speech at the Paciﬁc Island Development Forum’s meeting in Suva in September
2015. Similarly, the relocation has been on the political agenda of the Maldives in the Indian
Ocean as well. During the regime of former president Mohammed Nasheed, plans were on
the table according to which Maldivians would relocate to either Sri Lanka, India or
Australia at the time of the inundation of land[9]. To evaluate the two relocation scenarios
and to avoid the “blame game” that might follow from the attribution of moral
responsibilities to host, we need to look at the suitability of proposed new home countries, in
this case Sri Lanka and New Zealand, to host theMaldives and Kiribati.
Suitability to host can be looked at through two characteristics of potential host
countries: capacity and proximity. Capacity and proximity relate to the particular
characteristics that the proposed states have to host newcomers. According to the accounts
that underline capacity as a determinant factor of responsibility allocation, the most suitable
agent is the one that has the best means to bear responsibility for those in need (Shue, 1996).
Historically, the great powers in particular have been portrayed as the states most capable
in material terms and therefore those having the greatest responsibilities in world politics
(Brown, 2004). In the case, we are discussing here, capacity means the new host state’s
ability to accommodate the newcomers, both in social and economic terms. One could argue,
for instance, that given that the majority of the Paciﬁc Small Island Developing States are
themselves listed as the least developed countries, it would be unreasonable to burden these
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societies by hosting Kiribati. Even Fiji, which has repeatedly expressed its interest in
hosting its neighbors if needed and already has two islands with predominantly i-Kiribati
and Tuvaluan populations, might not have sufﬁcient capital (both social and economic) to
do so[10].
In its report, “Paciﬁc Possible: Labor Mobility”, published in 2016, the World Bank
proposes a new “Australia–New Zealand Atoll Access Agreement”. The agreement would
allow “open labor market access to the atoll countries most impacted by climate change and
most in need of additional labor mobility opportunities (Kiribati and Tuvalu) to Australia
and New Zealand (Curtain et al., 2016, p. 5)”. According to the World Bank’s vision, already
existing limited open access arrangements must be expanded to include all the citizens in the
most endangered nations – from Kiribati and Tuvalu in particular[11]. “The worsening
impacts of climate change”, the report states, “have provided a new moral imperative for
providing open access (ibid., p. 30, emphasis added)”. Whereas some limited migration
agreements with Kiribati and Tuvalu are already in place, they are insufﬁcient as the
population growth in both of these endangered atoll states is very rapid while the erosion of
habitable land is also rapidly expanding.
It is true that developed wealthy countries such as New Zealand and Australia could
easily accommodate if not all, at least most, incoming islanders. In the words of Heyward
and Ödalen, it is indeed important not to overestimate the numbers here (Heyward and
Ödalen, 2016, p. 220). As of 2016, Kiribati has a population of 114,395[12]. While the number
is high for a fragile low-lying atoll country such as Kiribati (which suffers severely from
overcrowding), it would only be a 2 per cent increase to the current population of New
Zealand. Likewise, in the case of Maldives and Sri Lanka, one could use the argument of the
pre-existing Maldivian population in Sri Lanka. Approximately 10,000 Maldivians already
live permanently in the country, predominantly in the Colombo area (Government of the
Maldives, 2017). In numbers, 417,492 Maldivians would make up 2 per cent of the current
21.2 million Sri Lankans.
Unlike is the case with the developed state of New Zealand, one has to nonetheless
critically evaluate the capacity of the developing state of Sri Lanka, recently ravaged by war,
to host a large number of incomingmigrants from theMaldives. Now, according to Heyward
and Ödalen, it might be unlikely that all the Maldivians would even want to relocate to Sri
Lanka in the ﬁrst place and if they did, there should be an international mechanism in place
to help Sri Lanka to relocate its neighbors. Following their proposal, a global compensation
scheme would help to bear the costs of hosting endangered populations (Heyward and
Ödalen, 2016, p. 221). Interestingly, the Maldives has a gross domestic product per capita
over double that of Sri Lanka ($8,601/3,835 in 2016) (World Bank, 2017). Perhaps one could
argue that any relocation costs, at least in the case of wealthy endangered states such as the
Maldives, should be borne by the relocating country itself. Of course, the primary income of
the Maldives is tourism, which derives from its islands and climate change might
signiﬁcantly change theMaldivian revenues in the near future[13].
One particularly important counter-argument against Maldivian relocation to Sri Lanka
relates to numbers, and especially to the numbers of ethnic background. While the Maldives
is a Muslim country, Sri Lanka is home to all four major world religions. One might be able
to assume that this heterogeneity would be an asset when considering the potential
relocation of the Maldivian population. However, its relocation might be considered a threat
to the existing ethnic populations as well. The reason for this derives from recent Sri Lankan
history, another contingent reason that should not be underestimated when mulling over the
relocation scenario in this particular case. Sri Lanka is still recovering from a long and
violent civil war that was fought between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and the
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Buddhist state. It is unnecessary to go into detail here concerning the Sri Lankan civil war.
The war took place in different stages between 1983 and 2009. The ofﬁcial Sri Lankan
governmental opinion ever since the war has been that the war was not an ethnic conﬂict
(United Nations, 2015). It is not nonetheless difﬁcult to draw the conclusion that the war was
between the predominantly Hindu Tamil population in the Northern and Eastern provinces
and the Buddhist majority state in the Western parts of the country. Given the ethnic
division on the battleﬁelds, hesitancy to shake up the existing ethnic and religious balance
in the country is understandable. According to the most recent census, 70.2 per cent of Sri
Lankan population is Buddhist, 12.6 per cent Hindus, 9.7 per cent Muslim and 7.4 per cent
Christians (Government of Sri Lanka, 2011). If all the Maldivians relocated to Sri Lanka
tomorrow, that would increase the Muslim population close to 2.5 million people, a bit over
10 per cent of the overall population and close to the second biggest ethnicity (given that the
Maldivians are all Muslims, which of course is not necessarily the case).
Whereas economic capacity is indeed a merely contingent factor, and may not therefore
have a proper moral weight when thinking about the suitability to host endangered
communities (especially if the global compensation scheme for host countries was
introduced), identity is not. The identity is importantly also the basis for the “human right to
exist as a people” that the islanders themselves call for. Here, the paper does not seek to
display religion as a factor creating conﬂict at the time of relocation but it is an important
factor for one’s identity as an individual and as a citizen of a certain state.
In addition to capacity, then, one also has to look at the suitability of a host country for
the endangered population in terms of proximity. This can mean geographical proximity,
including similar climate conditions or cultural and social proximity, in terms of the likeness
of the respective culture and traditions (including religion as discussed above). Heyward and
Ödalen mention cultural closeness as one factor that might make territorially dispossessed
populations choose one home country over another one. Here lies the major potential
difﬁculty of their proposal, as it lacks a genuine sensitivity regarding the consequences of
relocation to both relocating and hosting states by only placing emphasis on the needs and
rights of the endangered. The relocating imaginaries are not short of tragedy. Yet, allocating
responsibilities to host based on these imaginaries should not be done lightly, especially
because the claim of Small Island Developing States is not only the claim to having their
citizens relocated somewhere else. The passport of territorially dispossessed would not be
enough when relocating communities were asking to have recognized standing as peoples as
well. This is because the duty-claims made by the Small Island Developing States would not
be limited to the new citizenship, as discussed by Heyward and Ödalen.
The greatest problem in Heyward and Ödalen’s admirable and innovative proposal is
that they consider the citizens of Small Island Developing States merely as a limited number
of individuals looking for protection in new territories. This becomes evident at the very end
of their paper where they imagine a potentially much larger relocation scenario, Bangladesh.
In relation to Bangladesh, they argue: “unless a very large part of Bangladesh becomes
submerged, the state of Bangladesh will continue to exist (Heyward and Ödalen, 2016, p. 222,
emphasis added)”. However, the moral claim put forward, at least by some of island leaders,
toward the international community has precisely been one of continuous political existence.
World history is full of examples of wars, civil conﬂicts and political turbulence over self-
determination based on national and other forms of ethnic identity (one needs only to look at
the recent events in Barcelona). In the words of the former prime minister of Tuvalu who
argued strongly against relocation, Tuvaluans are “a proud nation of people with a unique
culture which cannot be relocated somewhere else (Apisai Ielemia quoted in McAdam,
2012a, p. 145)”. Identity is a complex matter affecting both the host and the endangered
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nation, and in the case of relocation, it might be that these two identities can be in severe
conﬂict with one another.
To evaluate the importance of proximity, let us consider another example. My home
country Finland is by population a small (5.5 million people), although geographically large,
state in the Northern Europe (338,424 km2, in average 16 people/km2, the most sparsely
populated country in Europe) (Statistics Finland, 2017). Hosting a great number of islanders
as climate refugees would not be, in terms of capacity, too burdensome on a welfare state
such as Finland. In fact, the original Alien Act from 2004[14] was one of the few immigration
laws in the world that explicitly acknowledged international protection on the basis of
environmental threat[15]. The Finnish land-ownership is also dependent on strong individual
land-ownership rights; 60 per cent of Finnish forestry, for example, is privately owned (in
comparison to 26 per cent owned by the state) (Finnish Forest Association, 2016). While the
majority of land is privately owned, something called “everyone’s right” (“jokamiehen
oikeus” in Finnish) also exists whereby anyone can use land to pick berries or hunt game and
ﬁsh, as long as no damage to the land is caused (and, in the case of hunting or ﬁshing, one has
acquired a license to do so). This right to use natural resources guarantees everyone the
entitlement to beneﬁt from nature, even in the case of privately owned land.
In many respects, then, Finland would make a great host for islanders looking for a new
place to call home, perhaps even better than New Zealand or Sri Lanka. Not only does the
country have the economic capacity to host more migrants than it currently does, but also
the cultural traditions concerning land ownership and respect to land are also surprisingly
similar to those in the Small Island Developing States. Would the islanders choose Finland
as their home country? There are good reasons why they could, and perhaps should, do so.
The quality of life in Finland is among the highest in the world (Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development, 2017), together with the enjoyment and protection of basic
human rights. However, the reasons not to choose Finland to be the new home might be
stronger than the ones to choose it, given the cultural and geographical distances that
prevail between the Northern hemisphere Finland and tropical islands of Kiribati and the
Maldives[16]. In the words of former president of the Maldives, Sri Lanka and India were
chosen as potential new homelands “because they had similar cultures, cuisines and climates
(The Guardian, 2008 10 November)”. The same can hardly be said about Finland. These
reasons do not undermine the argument that the wealthy developed country Finland has
speciﬁc responsibilities towards the weaker members of international society. It is just to
say that making all-things-considered evaluations of, and suggestions for, future relocation
and the duty to host, the differences and claims on both sides should be better taken into
account when arguing either or[17]. While these cultural and climatic considerations, for
instance, might at ﬁrst seem “merely contingent”, they do bear an important moral weight
on decisions where to relocate – and, as we saw from the discussion on Sri Lanka, who to
host as well.
A crucially important issue that needs to be taken better into consideration when
thinking about the potential relocation scenarios is the traditional relationship people have
to place, known as custom (kastom) in the South Paciﬁc. While the colonial period changed
the ownership-relations in what today are independent Paciﬁc Small Island Developing
States, the importance of custom for peoples’ identity and relationship to their homeland is
still signiﬁcant. In the words of MacClancy, custom overlaps everything in the Paciﬁc way of
life: “kastom [. . .] is not merely an odd collection of dances and rituals, but a whole way of
life that dictates almost all of one’s actions and provides its own particular interpretation for
almost everything that happens. It is complete unto itself. (MacClancy, 2002, p. 20)”. The
Paciﬁc existence is very much about the existence from and with land: “People and their
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ancestors grouped into clans, each of which lived on its own land. This ground, the physical
embodiment of the metaphysical link between the past and present member of a clan, both
provided the bones of people’s ancestors and provided them with food. (Ibid., p. 21)”. The
same also applies to theMaldives (Kelman, 2015). Any sustainable relocation plan, therefore,
has to accommodate the metaphysical attachments to a place that are enforced by the notion
of traditional land ownership across the Small Island Developing States.
Again, this is something that Heyward and Ödalen touch upon, mainly through the work
of Avner de-Shalit regarding relocation and identity. Following de-Shalit, Heyward and
Ödalen argue that if it is the case that:
Place is partly constitutive of an individual’s identity, and it important to protect individuals’
senses of identity, then the territorially dispossessed should be provided with the means to
construct a new identity in a new place (Heyward and Ödalen, 2016, p. 215).
They furthermore stress that because the new homeland chosen by the relocated population
is not obviously their ﬁrst choice (the ﬁrst choice being their homeland) they need to be
given free choice, so they can voluntarily choose the new place of identity. Some could
indeed choose Finland. To relocate the political community of the Maldives or the political
community of Kiribati to Finland would, however, be challenging because of several
contingent yet ethically well-grounded reasons, reasons that all are founded on our
identities: language, climate, religion and culture. It is also important to note that this would
be challenging not only for the incoming population, but to the hosting one as well, a factor
that is too often ignored in these debates (for an important exception on the ethics of
immigration, Miller, 2016). Even regional proximity on its own cannot solve the issue of
displaced identity, and this is why some islanders ﬁnd it hard to contemplate relocation even
to their closer neighbors, as it is the case with the i-Kiribati and New Zealand – or the
i-Kiribati and Fiji. Thus, even the seemingly non-problematic[18] relocation scenario of New
Zealand hosting its Paciﬁc neighbor Kiribati might not be that non-problematic after all.
Indeed, as it has been pointed out in the relation to the Marshallese relocation plans to the
USA, the same concerns and anxieties relating to continuous identity, culture and self-
determination prevail despite the easy access and existing communal ties (McAdam, 2012a,
p. 36).
4. Conclusions
This paper has taken the initial steps in exploring the continuous existence of
endangered low-lying atoll states from the perspective of potential relocation. By
looking at two hypothetical, yet actually proposed scenarios of relocation, the paper has
explored the relationship between endangered atoll states and their potential hosts. As
we have seen, the responsibility-allocation between the host and endangered
populations is problematic and direct causal links or harm-right relationships cannot be
straightforwardly drawn.
The Small Island Developing States might have legitimate rights–claims toward
international society concerning their continuous existence. It is clearly the case that
the Small Island Developing States have not themselves signiﬁcantly contributed to
climate change and consequent sea-level-rise and should not be punished by state-
extinction either. If there is a contributory fault, it does not (at least predominantly) rest
on the endangered communities (although they of course are not completely “morally
innocent” either[19]). Thus, the international community must take their claims for
continuous existence seriously and if the time comes, there must be means to tackle the
question of relocation. At the same time, it should not be forgotten – as it appears to
IJCCSM
10,2
238
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
TA
M
PE
RE
 A
t 2
3:
44
 1
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
often be the case in climate justice and legal literature – that any rights–claims put
forward by the islanders are always claims against the rights–claims of other states
and their citizens who also enjoy similar rights.
The rights and responsibilities we attach to solving the difﬁcult questions relating to the
future of Small Island Developing States should be carefully evaluated, as morality requires,
by all sides. As Jane McAdam I believe well argues against the international climate refugee
treaty, the key concern is the lack of political will. “It could be argued”, she maintains, “that
states might be prepared to adopt such an instrument precisely to call for shared
responsibility. For example, an individual state might perceive a need to respond to
potential arrivals of ‘climate refugees’, but be unwilling to unilaterally create legal avenues
for their protection” (McAdam, 2012a, p. 198). Any multilateral action to share
responsibility, however, do not replace or solve the lack of political will to tackle the issue.
“A treaty [or a duty or right] per se does not “solve” the problem (ibid. p. 199).” The same
applies to the freedom to choose the new home. The moral rights regarding the continuous
existence of Small Island Developing States are often made in the literature from the
perspective of low-lying atoll islands alone. Instead, what we would need are truly reciprocal
proposals that do not become the prisoners of “blame game”. The only way forward, it
seems to me, is to seek for mutually beneﬁcial political arrangements between the
endangered communities and potential host states.
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Notes
1. This paper considers relocation en masse, that is a scenario in which the whole population
relocates to a new territory. The author acknowledges that, if and when relocation becomes
timely, it is most likely to occur in phases and not at once. The most likely scenario for the
citizens of low-lying atoll states, therefore, is a gradual resettlement – ﬁrst domestically and
regionally, and only then to other states, as Jane McAdam, for instance, has demonstrated
(McAdam, 2012a,b). To explore this unlikely alternative is not meant to undermine the climate
change adaptation and mitigation measures taken by the endangered low-lying atoll states
(Barnett and Campbell, 2010).
2. The situation of Niue or the Marshall Islands, however, diﬀers signiﬁcantly from that of the
Maldives or Kiribati, “since they already have a ‘solution’”, namely, the access to New Zealand
and the USA (McAdam, 2012a, p. 36).
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3. In his recent concept paper for this journal, Bayes Ahmed argues in relation to Bangladesh that
we might be able to identify states with the greatest responsibilities toward climate immigrants
(Ahmed, 2017). This paper aims at challenging this kind of proposal by looking at the speciﬁc
plans already in place.
4. Indeed, there are signiﬁcant regional diﬀerences in perspectives on the likelihood of relocation.
McAdam has pointed this out in her research, showing how the policies of Kiribati and Tuvalu in
particular diﬀer on the matter (McAdam, 2012a, pp. 202-207). The current Prime Minister of
Tuvalu, Enel Sapoaga, underlined the position against the relocation as well. Interview with Enel
Sapoaga in Suva on August 23, 2017.
5. This paper is a part of bigger project of the author on the Small Island Developing States and the
existential threat. This research has been guided by “elite interviews” conducted by the author in
Sri Lanka, the Maldives and the South Paciﬁc region, between 2015 and 2017. Those interviewed
have included various state-oﬃcials, including senior governmental oﬃcers and head of state.
The purpose of these interviews has been to help to conceptualize the nature of “existential
threat” the Small Island Developing States arguably now face, as well as to identify the
responsibilities that the leaders of these states except to be fulﬁlled by the international
community. The interviews were semi-structured and recorded or typed. The identity of
interviewees has been withheld unless the permission to “go on record” has been explicitly given.
Elite interviews, as has been noted by Glenn Beamer, are useful tools for constructing the beliefs
of political actors (Beamer, 2002), which is why they have been used to guide the theoretical work
in this project as well.
6. The leaders have underlined “migration with dignity” across the Paciﬁc, the most vocal
promoters being the recently deceased Tony de Brum of the Marshall Islands and the former
president of Kiribati, Anote Tong.
7. Jenny Grote Stoutenburg has argued that because Small Island Developing States have not
themselves contributed to the sea-level-rise through signiﬁcant fossil fuel emissions, they should
not be punished for them either. Grounding her proposal on the central legal principles of
international law, Stoutenburg interestingly suggests that there might be at least a moral duty to
continue recognizing Small Island States as states even at the time of inundation of their land.
Here, Stoutenburg’s argument relies on the ideas of causal responsibility and contributory harm.
While she does not identify any particular agent as the duty-bearer for direct harm, she suggests
that international society as a whole has the responsibility toward Small Island States to
guarantee their continuing existence. (Stoutenburg, 2015, chapter 5). On a more general note, one
could argue that because the contemporary climate justice debate seems to concentrate on
responsibility for emissions, its practical applications are in a deadlock. While the Paris
Agreement (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 2015) introduced both
“loss and damage” – principle and mechanisms such as “global stock take” to follow-up the
process of national governments, the future of the Agreement is yet to be seen, especially when
one of the world’s biggest emitters, the USA, has left the treaty.
8. According to the principle of “common but diﬀerentiated responsibilities”, all humankind bears
responsibility for the future of our planet, yet some actors (developed states) bear greater
responsibility because of their greater contribution to the harm (United Nations, 1992).
9. Interestingly, there is no oﬃcial documentation available on these relocation plans. When the
author asked the question about the aforementioned relocation scenarios in the interviews with
the Maldivian governmental oﬃcials, she was told that the plans were indeed made accordingly
but that one could not ﬁnd any oﬃcial policy documents in which they would be laid out. The
former president, Mohammed Nasheed, conﬁrmed the existence of relocation plans under his
regime. Interviews with anonymous governmental sources at the Ministry of Environment and
Energy in Malé June 12, 2017 and with Nasheed in Colombo June 15, 2017.
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10. Prime Minister Bainimarama has regularly expressed Fiji’s willingness to serve as a new
home state to the endangered Paciﬁc low-lying atoll states (Bainimarama, 2017). Its
neighbors have not, however, appreciated Fiji’s positioning itself as the leader of the region
(Qounadovu, 2017).
11. Bilateral agreements between the United States, Australia and New Zealand and certain Small
Island Developing States already exist. Citizens of the Marshall Islands and Palau have access to
the American labor market and the citizens of Niue and the Cook Islands to New Zealand. As the
World Bank notes, these arrangements are usually arranged upon joint history and cultural
similarity (Curtain et al., 2016, p. 30).
12. All population ﬁgures here are from the World Bank (2016).
13. In the interviews with the Maldivian governmental oﬃcials, it became evident that the Maldives
is not currently actually contemplating the possibility of relocation at all. When directly asked
about the potential of Sri Lanka becoming a new home country for the displaced Maldivians, the
answer was given that the Maldives’s plan is not to lose its independence and sovereignty. The
current governmental position is that the country would reclaim land rather than relocate.
Interviews with the Maldivian governmental oﬃcials at the Ministry of Environment and Energy
in Malè, 12 June 2017.
14. According to Article 88a of Aliens Act 301/2004, “an alien residing in Finland is issued a
residence permit on the basis of humanitarian protection, if there are no grounds [. . .] for
granting asylum or providing subsidiary protection, but he or she cannot return to his or her
country of origin or country of former habitual residence as a result of an environmental
catastrophe or a poor security situation, which may be because of an international or internal
armed conﬂict or a poor human rights situation (Government of Finland, 2004, p. 32)”.
15. The law has, however, been modiﬁed in 2016 and does not have the exact article anymore. In the
travaux préparatoires from 2016 to amend the Act, however, the government explicitly states that
this does not mean that the protection cannot be provided based on environmental threat under the
modiﬁed law as well. According to the travaux préparatoires HE 2/2016, both groups and individuals
could still be protected under other articles (Government of Finland, 2016).
16. The distance should not be however overestimated here. As the reviewer of this article
interestingly noted to me, there are a great number of Marshallese living in Arkansas, United
States. Arkansas is no more obvious of relocation destination to the Marshallese, in terms of
proximity (excluding the fact that it is easy to the citizens of Marshall Islands to move to the
United States due to the existing visa arrangements), than Finland would be to i-Kiribati.
17. The most well-known advocate of the national right to choose immigrants is David Miller, who
has argued that democratic states must have the right to exclude people from their citizenry
(Miller, 2016. See also a recent special issue with responses to his argument and Miller’s reply in
Parvin et al., 2017).
18. Given that there already exists a signiﬁcant i-Kiribati population in New Zealand; the proximity
of two countries in geographic terms; that New Zealand has already expressed its willingness to
host the Paciﬁc islanders by existing visa schemes; and New Zealand is a wealthy developed
state and has suﬃcient means to serve as a host state.
19. Interestingly, there is a long history of perceiving especially the South Paciﬁc region as the
place of “innocence” and “indigenous purity”, consequently destroyed by Western settlers.
The “moral voice” of Small Island Developing States still very much relies on this imaginary
of innocence; the publicly expressed idea that the region itself has done nothing to bear the
horrendous consequences of climate change and should not therefore suﬀer for it either.
While the narrative of innocence can (and should) be challenged as well (Vaha, 2017), it is
important and plays a crucial role in relation to the normative negotiating power of Small
Island Developing States in international global regimes such as the UNFCCC. The Paciﬁc
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Small Island Developing States, for example, already in the 1990s pushed for a category of
“small and vulnerable economies” as a separate category from the United Nation’s “least
developed countries” category at the World Trade Organization (Morgan, 2015, p. 254). The
nature of the “normative power” of Small Island Developing States is a fascinating research
topic on its own and needs to be studied further.
References
Ahmed, B. (2017), “Who takes responsibility for the climate refugees?”, International Journal of Climate
Change Strategies and Management (open access), available at: https://doi.org/10.1108/IJCCSM-
10-2016-0149
Bainimarama, V. (2017), Key Address at the Climate Action Paciﬁc Partnership Event, Suva 3 July,
2017, Field note.
Barnett, J. (2017), “The dilemmas of normalizing losses from climate change: towards hope for paciﬁc
atoll countries”,Asia Paciﬁc Viewpoint, Vol. 58 No. 1, pp. 3-13.
Barnett, J. and Campbell, J. (2010), Climate Change and Small Island States: Power, Knowledge and the
South Paciﬁc, Earthscan, New York, NY.
Beamer, G. (2002), “Elite interviews and state politics research”, State Politics and Policy Quarterly,
Vol. 2 No. 1, pp. 86-96.
Brown, C. (2004), “Do great powers have great responsibilities? Great powers andmoral agency”,Global
Society, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 5-19.
Burkett, M. (2013), “The Nation Ex-Situ”, in Gerrard, M. and Wannier, G. (Eds), Threatened Island
Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, pp. 89-121.
Caney, S. (2009), “Justice and the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions”, Journal of Global Ethics,
Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 125-146.
Curtain, R., Dornan, M., Doyle, J. and Howes, S. (2016), Paciﬁc Possible. Labour Mobility: The Ten
Billion Dollar Prize, World Bank Report of July 2016, available at: http://pubdocs.
worldbank.org/en/555421468204932199/pdf/labour-mobility-paciﬁc-possible.pdf (accessed
27 September 2017).
Feinberg, J. (1968), “Collective responsibility”, Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65 No. 21, pp. 674-688.
Finnish Forest Association (2016), “Forest ownership”, available at: www.smy.ﬁ/en/forest-ﬁ/forest-
facts/ﬁnnish-forests-owned-by-ﬁnns/ (accessed 2 August 2017).
Gerrard, M.B. and Wannier, G.E. (Eds) (2013), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising
Seas and a Changing Climate, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Government of Finland (2004), Aliens Act 301/2004, available at: www.ﬁnlex.ﬁ/ﬁ/laki/kaannokset/
2004/en20040301.pdf (accessed 27 July 2017).
Government of Finland (2016), Hallituksen esitys HE 2/2016, available at: www.eduskunta.ﬁ/FI/vaski/
HallituksenEsitys/Sivut/HE_262016.aspx (accessed 27 July 2017).
Government of Sri Lanka (2011), “The census of population and housing of Sri Lanka”, available at: www.
statistics.gov.lk/PopHouSat/CPH2011/index.ph/ﬁleName=pop43&gp=Activities&tpl= (accessed 2
August 2017).
Government of the Maldives (2017), “Maldives embassy to Colombo”, Sri Lanka website, available at:
http://maldivesembassy.lk/mecc (accessed 2 July 2017).
Hey, J.E., Suarez, A.G., Wong, P.P., Briguglio, L. and Ragoonaden, S. (2001), “Small Island States”,
in McGarthy, J.J., Canziani, O.F., Leary, N.A., Dokken, D.J., White, K.S. (Eds),
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: Impacts, Adaptation
and Vulnerability (Contribution of Working Group II to the Third Assessment Report of the
IJCCSM
10,2
242
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
TA
M
PE
RE
 A
t 2
3:
44
 1
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
pp. 843-875.
Heyward, C. and Ödalen, J. (2016), “A free movement passport for the territorially dispossessed”, in
Heyward, C. and Roser, D. (Eds), Climate Justice in a Non-Ideal World, Oxford University Press,
Oxford, pp. 208-226.
Kelman, I. (2015), “Difﬁcult decisions: migration from small island developing states under climate
change”, Earth’s Future, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 133-142.
Kohtari, U. (2014), “Political discourses of climate change and migration: resettlement policies in the
Maldives”,The Geographical Journal, Vol. 180 No. 2, pp. 130-140.
MacClancy, J. (2002),ToKill a Bird with Two Stones, Vanuatu Cultural Centre, Port Vila.
McAdam, J. (2012a), Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
McAdam, J. (2012b), “Disappearing states’, atatelessness and the boundaries of international law”, in
McAdam, J. (Ed.), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives, Hart
Publishing, Oxford, pp. 105-129.
Miller, D. (2016), Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration, Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, MA.
Morgan, W. (2015), “Negotiating power in contemporary paciﬁc trade diplomacy”, in Fry, G. and Tarte, S.
(Eds),The New Paciﬁc Diplomacy, Australian National University Press, Canberra, pp. 251-261.
New Zealand High Court (2013), Ioane Teitiota vs the Chief Executive of the Ministry of Business,
Innovation and Employment of 16.10.2013 CIV-2013-404-3528 [2013] NZHC 3125, available
at: https://forms.justice.govt.nz/search/Documents/pdf/jdo/56/alfresco/service/api/node/
content/workspace/SpacesStore/6f4d600a-373f-4ff8-8ba1-500fb7cc94b0/6f4d600a-373f-4ff8-8ba1-
500fb7cc94b0.pdf (accessed 2October 2017).
Ödalen, J. (2014), “Underwater self-determination: sea-level rise and deterritorialized small island
states”, Ethics, Policy & Environment, Vol. 17 No. 2, pp. 225-237.
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (2017), “Better life index: Finland”, available
at: www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/countries/ﬁnland/ (accessed 16 October 2017).
Paciﬁc Island Development Forum (2015), Suva Declaration on Climate Change, issued at the 3rd PIDF
Leaders Summit 2-4 September 2015 in Suva, Fiji Islands, available at: http://paciﬁcidf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/PACIFIC-ISLAND-DEVELOPMENT-FORUM-SUVA-DECLARATION-
ON-CLIMATE-CHANGE.v2.pdf (accessed 25 October 2017).
Parvin, P., Miller, D., Kukathas, C., Fine, S., Kollar, E., Straehle, C., Owen, D. and Angeli, O. (2017),
“Symposium on David miller’s strangers in our midst: the political philosophy of immigration”,
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 20No. 6, pp. 697-773.
Qounadovu, S. (2017), “Tuvalu prime minister: relocation not the answer to climate change”, Paciﬁc
Island Report Online Portal, available at: www.pireport.org/articles/2017/07/03/tuvalu-prime-
minister-relocation-not-answer-climate-change (accessed 6 October 2017).
Risse, M. (2009), “The right to relocation: disappearing island nations and common ownership of the
earth”, Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 281-300.
Robinson, M. (2010), “Foreword”, in Humphreys, S. (Ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. xvii-xvxx.
Shue, H. (1996), Basic Rights: Subsistence, Afﬂuence, and the US Foreign Policy, Princeton University
Press, Princeton.
Shue, H. (2014), Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Singer, P. (2002),OneWorld: The Ethics of Globalization, Text Publishing, Melbourne.
Statistics Finland (2017), “Statistics Finland”, available at: www.stat.ﬁ/org/index_en.html (accessed 5
October 2017).
Small Island
Developing
States
243
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
TA
M
PE
RE
 A
t 2
3:
44
 1
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
Stoutenburg, J. (2015),Disappearing Island States in International Law, Brill Nijhoff, Leiden.
The Guardian (2008), “Paradise almost lost: Maldives seek to buy a new homeland”, 10 November 2008,
available at: www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/nov/10/maldives-climate-change (accessed
17 October 2017).
Tong, A. (2015a), “Charting its own course’: a paradigm shift in paciﬁc diplomacy”, in Fry, G. and
Tarte, S. (Eds), The New Paciﬁc Diplomacy, Australian National University Press, Canberra,
pp. 21-24.
Tong, A. (2015b), Address to the Paciﬁc Island Development Forum Leaders Meeting, September 2-4,
Field notes, Suva.
United Nations (1992), “The Rio declaration on environment and development of 12 august 1992”, A/
CONF.151/26, Vol. I, available at: www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm
(accessed 2 October 2017).
United Nations (2015), Comprehensive Report of the Ofﬁce of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights on Sri Lanka of 28 September 2015, A/HRC/30/61, available at: www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/OISL.aspx (accessed 5 October 2017).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015), Paris Agreement as Contained in the
Report of the Conference of the Parties in its Twenty-First Session, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1,
available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/items/9445.php (accessed 22 March
2016).
Vaha, M.E. (2015), “Drowning under: small Island states and the right to exist”, Journal of International
Political Theory, Vol. 11 No. 2, pp. 206-223.
Vaha, M.E. (2017), “We as peoples have the right to exist: threatened nations and climate justice”,
Paciﬁc Affairs, Vol. 90 No. 4, pp. 767-776.
World Bank (2016), “Population, total”, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.
TOTL (accessed 27 July 2017).
World Bank (2017), “GDP per capita (current US$)”, available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 17 October 2017).
Yamamoto, L. and Esteban, M. (2014), Atoll Island States and International Law: Climate Change
Displacement and Sovereignty, Springer Verlag, Berlin.
Further reading
Death Cab for Cutie (2003), “Transatlanticism,” song from studio album Transatlanticism, lyrics by
Gibbard, B. andWalla, C. Barsuk Records, Seattle, WA.
About the author
Milla Emilia Vaha is currently a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of
Tampere, Finland. Her research focuses on the ethics of world politics, and her areas of specialization
include the ethics of war, global justice and Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy. In her current
research, she explores the future of small island states threatened by climate change, and she has
conducted comparative research in the South Paciﬁc and Indian Ocean regions. Her publications
include edited chapters and articles in journals such as the Journal of International Political Theory,
International Politics and Journal of Military Ethics. Milla Emilia Vaha can be contacted at: mevaha@
utu.ﬁ
For instructions on how to order reprints of this article, please visit our website:
www.emeraldgrouppublishing.com/licensing/reprints.htm
Or contact us for further details: permissions@emeraldinsight.com
IJCCSM
10,2
244
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 U
N
IV
ER
SI
TY
 O
F 
TA
M
PE
RE
 A
t 2
3:
44
 1
1 
M
ar
ch
 2
01
8 
(P
T)
